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Coalition stability is extended to include uncertain preference using matrix representation
within the framework of the graphmodel for conflict resolution. Coalition stability analysis
within a graph model provides guidance for decision makers and analysts by providing
an assessment of whether states that are individually stable are unstable for coalitions. In
using the graph model method for conflict resolution one carries out stability analysis of
a graph model, and then follows up with post-stability analysis, an important component
of which is coalition analysis. Although basic coalition stabilities have been defined for the
graph model, they are based on a transitive graph, which is inconsistent with the standard
restriction in the graph model. Algorithms for implementing these coalition stabilities
have not been developed, because the nature of their logical representations makes coding
difficult. Additionally, existing coalition stabilities apply only to simple preference, which
limits their utility for exploring more complicated applications in practice. In this paper,
coalition stabilities are extended to include uncertain preference and represented using
matrices, which are more effective and convenient for computer implementation and for
adaptation to new analysis techniques.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) was originally proposed by Kilgour et al. [1] in 1987 to provide a
convenient and effectivemeans formodeling and analyzing a strategic conflict. As shown in Fig. 1, the approach for applying
GMCR to a particular conflict consists of the modeling and analysis stages. The modeling stage includes identification of the
decision makers (DMs), each DM’s actions or options under its control, states formed from option selections by the DMs,
the state transitions between states controlled by each DM, and each DM’s relative preferences over the states [2]. A DM
may be an individual or a group, such as an industrial or governmental organization. The analysis system of GMCR consists
of stability analysis and post-stability analysis including status quo analysis [3,4] and coalition analysis [5–7] using a graph
model structure. Specifically, the analysis stage includes the determination of whether a state is stable from each DM’s
viewpoint for a range of solution concepts describing human behavior under conflicts. States that are stable for all DMs
according to a given solution concept are called equilibria [2]. On the basis of the individual stability analysis, DMs can
request additional follow up analyses to generate valuable decision guidance. Status quo analysis aims to assess whether
and how a particular equilibrium is reachable from a status quo or an initial state.
A coalition is a subset of DMs. A state that is not an equilibrium has no long-term stability because there is at least one
individual DM that has the incentive to move away to upset the temporarily stable state [5]. Therefore, a non-equilibrium
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Fig. 1. Procedure for applying GMCR (adapted from [2]).
Table 1
Current status of the graph model for conflict resolution (extended from [13]).
Preference information Stability and post-stability analyses Definitions? Algorithms?
Simple preference
Individual stability analysis Yes Yes
Status quo analysis Yes Yes
Coalition stability analysis Yes No
Preference with uncertainty
Individual stability analysis Yes No
Status quo analysis Yes Yes
Coalition stability analysis No No
state is not expected to persist in any case, including coalition stability. The discussions of coalition stability in this paper are
focused on the status quo states that are equilibria. The coalition stability analysis within the graphmodel assesses whether
states that are stable from individual viewpoints may be unstable for coalitions. Therefore, coalition analysis provides
valuable guidance for decision analysts.
In the original graph model with simple preference, individual stabilities including four basic stability definitions, Nash
stability [8,9], generalmetarationality (GMR) [10], symmetricmetarationality (SMR) [10], and sequential stability (SEQ) [11],
were defined using logical structures that refer to the underlying graphs and preference relations [2]. Subsequently,
Kilgour et al. [5] defined coalition stabilities based on Nash stability for which pseudo-code was furnished retaining a
logical structure. A new preference structure proposed by Li et al. [12] for representing uncertainty in DMs’ preferences
was included into some extensions of logical representations of Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ. Algorithms for implementing
these extended stabilities were outlined but never fully developed and implemented, because the nature of their logical
representations makes coding difficult. Status quo analysis for simple preference and preference with uncertainty was
developed by Li et al. [3,4], but only in the form of pseudo-codes following a similar logical structure, which has never been
implemented in a practical decision support system. Table 1 shows the current situation of available individual stability and
coalition stability and status quo analysis, as well as the development of effective algorithms and codes for implementing
these individual and coalitional stabilities and status quo analysis [13]. Obviously, to date, due to the nature of logical
representations, many definitions have been proposed for the graph model, but algorithms for implementing them have
not been developed.
Although some algorithms for collaboration are available [14], it is not easy to develop algorithms for implementing
coalition stabilities. Coalitions and coalition stability have been widely studied in the area of conflict analysis. For example,
inspired by Aumann [15], Kilgour et al. [5] proposed coalition stability based on Nash stability within the framework of the
GMCR. Then, Inohara and Hipel [6,7] extended the above Nash coalition stability to GMR, SMR, and SEQ coalition stabilities.
To make coding easier, these extensions were based on a transitive graph that allows the same DM to move twice in
succession, which is inconsistent with the standard restriction in the graph model. For example, in the work of Inohara
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Fig. 2. Link between status quo analysis and coalition analysis.
et al. [6,7] and Kilgour et al. [5], the reachable list of a coalition may include states reachable only by consecutive moves of
the same DM. Additionally, as shown in Table 1, these coalition stabilities were defined logically within a simple preference
structure which includes only a strict relative preference relation,, and an indifference relation,∼. The simple preference
structure is often inadequate for modeling the complex strategic conflicts that arise in practical applications.
To expand the realm of applicability of GMCR and provide more insights into strategic conflicts, coalition stabilities are
extended in this paper to models including uncertain preference. Additionally, an innovative matrix system for calculating
potential resolutions and tracking the possible evolution of a conflict has been proposed by Xu et al. [16,17]. The matrix
representation effectively converts stability analysis and status quo analysis from a logical to an algebraic structure, so it is
natural to exploit thematrix approach for performing coalition analysis also. Matrix representations of coalition stability for
simple preference and extended coalition stabilities for preference with uncertainty are developed in this paper to facilitate
the development of improved algorithms for the case of Nash stability. Moreover, the proposed matrix approach reveals
an inherent link, shown in Fig. 2, using the matrix function LJH (defined below), between status quo analysis and coalition
analysis and hence makes it possible to establish an integrated paradigm for post-stability analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the background of coalition analysis in the graph model and
several important definitions are reviewed. Subsequently, the extension and matrix representation of coalition stabilities
are presented in Sections 3 and 4. In Section 5, it is explained how the matrix representation of the extended coalition
stabilities can be applied in practice by using a case study—the Gisborne Lake conflict under uncertain preference [12,18].
Some comments and insights are furnished in Section 6.
2. Background of coalition analysis and matrix representation in a graph model
2.1. A graph model for conflict resolution
A graphmodel is a structure G〈(S, A),N, P, c〉, where N is a non-empty set of DMs, S and A are the sets of states and arcs,
respectively, and (S, A) is a digraph with preference relations P between any two states and a function c : A→ N such that
c(a) ∈ N is the DM controlling the arc a ∈ A, provided that multiple edges of (S, A) are controlled by different DMs, i.e., if
a 6= b, but a = (u, v) and b = (u, v), then c(a) 6= c(b).
Preference information plays an essential role in the graph model. This type of the preference structure {,∼} is called
‘‘simple preference’’ in this paper. Due to difficulty in obtaining accurate preference information in practical cases, models
that allow uncertain preference are very useful. As pointed out by Fischer et al. [19,20], conflicts among the attributes of
alternatives can cause preference uncertainty. To enhance the applicability of the graphmodel, Li et al. [12] proposed a new
preference structure in which DM i’s preferences are expressed by a triplet of relations {i,∼i,Ui} on S, wherei indicates
DM i’s strict preference, ∼i indicates indifference, and Ui denotes uncertain preference. Specifically, sUiq means DM i may
prefer state s to state q, may prefer q to s, or may be indifferent between s and q. Preferencewith uncertainty contains simple
preference as a special case.
For preference with uncertainty, the preference relations of each DM i ∈ N are assumed to have the following
properties [12]:
• i is asymmetric;
• ∼i is reflexive and symmetric;
• Ui is symmetric;
• {i,∼i,Ui} is strongly complete.
If for any relation R and any states k, s, and q, kRs and sRq imply kRq, then R is transitive. In this paper, transitivity of
preferences is not required, and all results holdwhether preferences are transitive or intransitive. For example, the uncertain
preference relation, U , is often intransitive.
2.2. Logical representation of coalition stability for simple preference
Any subset H of DMs in the set N is called a coalition. If |H| > 0, then the coalition H is non-empty; if |H| = 1, then the
coalition H is trivial; if |H| > 1, then the coalition H is non-trivial.
If H is trivial with H = {i}, the DM i’s reachable lists, from a state s ∈ S, by various moves for simple preference and
preference with uncertainty are as follows [2,12]:
• Ri(s) = {q ∈ S : (s, q) ∈ Ai}: DM i’s reachable list from state s by unilateral moves (UMs) in one step;
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• R+i (s) = {q ∈ S : (s, q) ∈ Ai and qi s}: DM i’s reachable list from state s by unilateral improvements (UIs) in one step;
• R+,Ui (s) = {q ∈ S : (s, q) ∈ Ai and qi s or qUis}: DM i’s reachable list from state s by unilateral improvements or
unilateral uncertain moves in one step.
Note that Ri(s) and R+i (s) are also called DM i’s UMs and UIs from s, respectively.
For a two-DM model, DM i’s opponent is one DM, j, so DM j’s reachable lists from state s are made by one-step moves.
In an n-DM model (n > 2), the opponents of a DM constitute a group of two or more DMs. Below, a coalition H ⊆ N is
assumed to be non-trivial. A legal sequence of UMs in a graph model for a coalition of DMs is a sequence of states linked
by UMs controlled by members of the coalition, in which a DMmay move more than once, but not twice consecutively [2].
Similarly, we may define a legal sequence of UIs. Previous research for coalition analysis [5–7] relaxes the restriction. If a
DM can move consecutively, then this DM’s graph is effectively transitive. Prohibiting consecutive moves thus allows for
graph models with intransitive graphs, which are sometimes useful in practice.
Let the coalition H ⊆ N satisfy |H| ≥ 2 and let the status quo state be s ∈ S. DM i’s reachable lists from s, Ri(s) and R+i (s),
can be extended to coalition H ’s reachable lists by the legal sequence of UMs and UIs from s, RH(s) and R+H (s) [2].
The following coalition stability based on Nash stability is adapted from [5]. For an equilibrium, no DM has the incentive
to move away from it, but a coalition may sometimes be able to move away from the equilibrium to a better state for all
members of the coalition.Hence, analysts candetect equilibria that are vulnerable to coalitionmoves in strategic conflicts [5].
Definition 1. State s ∈ S is Nash stable for coalition H ⊆ N(|H| ≥ 2) iff for every s1 ∈ RH(s), there exists i ∈ H with si s1.
The original Nash stability was defined for an individual DM [8,9]. For example, s is Nash stable for DM i iff R+i (s) = ∅.
Therefore, Nash stability of a coalition cannot be treated as the combination of Nash stabilities of all DMs in the coalition.
Definition 2. State s ∈ S is coalitionally Nash stable iff s is Nash stable for every coalition H ⊆ N(|H| ≥ 2).
Definition 1 was originally defined by Kilgour et al. [5] for the case of the reachable list of coalition H , RH(s), under the
assumption of a transitive graph. In this paper, a general case is assumed for Definition 1 for which transitivity is a special
case.
2.3. Matrix representation in the graph model for conflict resolution
A graph model may contain several arcs with the same initial and terminal states, but each arc is controlled by different
DMs. Assume that the state set S and the DM set N are numbered as S = {1, 2, . . . ,m} and N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, respectively.
By the proposed Rule of Priority [17,21], the oriented arcs in the graph model are labeled according to the DM order; within
each DM, according to the sequence of initial states; and within each DM and initial state, according to the sequence of
terminal states. For example, Fig. 3(1) shows a graph model with two DMs, DM 1 and DM 2, where vertices designate states
and arcs represent movement between states. The number on a given arc indicates which DM controls the movement while
the arrowhead shows the direction of movement. According to the Rule of Priority, the oriented arcs are numbered as in
Fig. 3(2).
Let m = |S|, n = |N|, and l = |A| denote the cardinalities of the state set S, DM set N , and arc set A, respectively, in the
following definitions.
Definition 3. For twom×mmatrices F andQ , theHadamard product [22] for the twomatrices is them×mmatrixM = F◦Q
with (s, q) entry
M(s, q) = F(s, q) · Q (s, q).
Definition 4. Suppose H ⊆ N . For a graph model G, the arc set for H contains all arc controlled by the DMs in H ,
i.e., AH = {a ∈ A : c(a) ∈ H}.
Important matrices associated with a digraph include the adjacency matrix J and the incidence matrix B [23]. These
matrices can be extended to a graph model.
Definition 5. Suppose H ⊆ N . For a graph model G, the adjacency matrix for H is them×mmatrix JH with (s, q) entry
JH(s, q) =
{
1 if (s, q) ∈ AH ,
0 otherwise,
where s, q ∈ S.
Definition 6. Suppose H ⊆ N . For a graph model G, the incidence matrix for H is them× lmatrix BH with (s, a) entry
BH(s, a) =
{−1 if a = (s, x) for some x ∈ S,
1 if a = (x, s) for some x ∈ S,
0 otherwise,
where s ∈ S and a ∈ AH .
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Fig. 3. The labeled graph model.
According to the signed entries, the incidence matrix can be separated into the in-incidence matrix and the out-incidence
matrix.
Definition 7. Suppose H ⊆ N . For a graph model G, the in-incidence matrix for H , BHin , and the out-incidence matrix for H ,
BHout , are them× lmatrices with (s, a) entries
BHin(s, a) =
{
1 if a = (x, s) for some x ∈ S,
0 otherwise,
and
BHout(s, a) =
{
1 if a = (s, x) for some x ∈ S,
0 otherwise,
where s ∈ S and a ∈ AH .
It is obvious that BHin = (BH + abs(BH))/2 and BHout = (abs(BH) − B)/2, where abs(BH) denotes the matrix in which each
entry equals the absolute value of the corresponding entry of BH . Definitions 6 and 7 are adapted from [23].
Definition 8. For a graph model G, the legal edge consecutive matrix LJH for coalition H is the l× lmatrix with (a, b) entry
LJH(a, b) =
{1 if edges a and b are consecutive in order ab
for a, b ∈ AH , and controlled by different DMs,
0 otherwise.
(1)
Let ci = |Ai| denote the cardinality of the arcs controlled by DM i and let Eci denote a ci× ci matrix with each entry equal
to 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then, D is defined as the following block diagonal matrix:
D =

Ec1 0 · · · 0
0 Ec2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · Ecn
 . (2)
It is obvious that the dimension of each diagonal block Eci depends on the number of edges controlled by DM i. More
specifically, let εi = ∑ij=1 cj for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. According to the Rule of Priority [16,17] for labeling edges, for any ak ∈ A and
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εi−1 < k ≤ εi, the edge ak is controlled by DM i. Hence, for any ak, ah ∈ A, if there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that k, h ∈ (εi−1, εi],
then edges ak and ah are controlled by the same DM i, and D(k, h) = 1. Also, D(k, h) = 0 iff edges ak and ah are controlled
by different DMs.
Preference information plays an important role in a graph model. A set of preference matrices can represent preference
relations between any two states with different requirements. Twom×m preference matrices are defined as follows:
P−,=i (s, q) =
{
1 if si q or s∼i q,
0 otherwise, (3)
and
P−,=,Ui (s, q) =
{
1 if si q, s∼i q or sUiq,
0 otherwise. (4)
The preferencematrix P−,=i may be used to represent less preferred or equally preferred relations and the preferencematrix
P−,=,Ui can represent less preferred, equally preferred, or uncertainly preferred relations between any two states.
3. Extension of coalition stability in the graph model
The original coalition analysis assumes simple preference. To enhance its applicability, we extend the definitions of
coalition stability to models including preference uncertainty.
3.1. Coalition stabilities in the graph model with preference uncertainty
A DM may be conservative or aggressive when faced with choice to avoid or accept states of uncertain preference. This
choice may depend on the level of satisfaction with the current position.
Definition 9. For s1 ∈ RH(s), s1 is a coalition improvement for H from state s, denoted by s1 ∈ CR+H (s), iff s1i s for every
i ∈ H .
This definition is different from that proposed by Kilgour et al. [5] for simple preference, which cannot be applied to analyze
models with uncertain preference. Note that CR+H (s) 6= R+H (s). Here, R+H (s) denotes the reachable list of coalition H by the
legal sequence of UIs from s [2].
Definition 10. For s1 ∈ RH(s), s1 is a coalition improvement or uncertain move for H from state s, denoted by s1 ∈ CR+,UH (s),
iff either s1i s or s1Uis for every i ∈ H .
A coalition improvement or uncertain move for H from state s is a state s1 that is reachable by H from s and preferred, or
has uncertain preference relative to s, by every DM in H . A coalition improvement or uncertain move s1 by H is a threat, or
potential threat, to the stability of state s. Note that even if state s is stable for each DM i ∈ H , the instability of s for coalition
H makes it impossible for s to become a resolution for a conflict when considering coalitions.
Definition 11. Suppose H ⊆ N . State s ∈ S is conservatively Nash stable for coalition H , denoted by s ∈ SCNashH , iff CR+H (s) = ∅,
i.e., there exists i ∈ H with si s1 or sUis1, for every s1 ∈ RH(s).
In Definition 11, coalition H is said to be conservative in deciding whether to move from the status quo, because it is not
willing to accept the risk associated with moves from the status quo to states of uncertain preference.
Definition 12. State s ∈ S is coalitionally conservatively Nash stable iff s is conservatively Nash stable for every coalition
H ⊆ N .
Similarly, coalition H may be aggressive when considering whether to move from a status quo, in that the coalition is
deterred only by states that are strictly less preferred than the status quo.
Definition 13. Suppose H ⊆ N . State s ∈ S is aggressively Nash stable for coalition H , denoted by s ∈ SANashH , iff CR+,UH (s) = ∅,
i.e., there exists i ∈ H with si s1, for every s1 ∈ RH(s).
Definition 14. State s ∈ S is coalitionally aggressively Nash stable iff s is aggressively Nash stable for every coalition H ⊆ N .
3.2. Interrelationships among individual and coalitional stabilities
Coalition H is trivial if H = {i} for some i ∈ N . Then Definition 11 reduces as follows:
Definition 15. State s ∈ S is conservatively Nash stable for DM i iff si s1 or sUis1 for every s1 ∈ Ri(s).
Note that Definition 15 is equivalent to Nashb stability [12].
When coalition H = {i}, Definition 13 reduces as follows:
Definition 16. State s ∈ S is aggressively Nash stable for DM i iff si s1 for every s1 ∈ Ri(s).
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Definition 16 is equivalent to Nasha stability [12]. The extension of coalition stability contains all results derived in the
paper [5]. Recall that Nasha = Nashc and Nashb = Nashd [12], so the extension also contains all Nash stabilities indexed
a, b, c and d proposed by Li et al. [12] as special cases.
4. Matrix representations for coalition stability analysis
The explicit algebraic expressions are advantageous for calculating potential resolutions and tracking conflict evolution
[17,16,21]. It is natural to exploit the matrix approach to perform coalition stability analysis for simple preference and
preference with uncertainty in the graph model.
4.1. Matrix representation of the reachable list of a coalition in the graph model
The UM reachability matrix of coalition H is a matrix of reachability by legal sequences of UMs for coalition H . Its formal
definition is given as follows.
Definition 17. Suppose H ⊆ N . For the graph model G, the UM reachability matrix of coalition H is an m × m matrix MH
with (s, q) entry
MH(s, q) =
{
1 if q ∈ RH(s) for q ∈ S,
0 otherwise.
Definition 17 is adapted from [16]. However, a new approach is proposed in this paper for constructing the UM reachability
matrix for H .
Lemma 1. For a graph model G, the adjacency matrix for H is expressed as
JH = sign[(BHout) · (BHin)T ]. (5)
From algebraic graph theory [23], Lemma 1 can easily follow. Here, sign(·) denotes the sign function.
Let El denote the l × lmatrix with each entry equal to 1. Then the legal edge consecutive matrix LJH can be constructed
as follows.
Lemma 2. Suppose H ⊆ N. For a graph model G, the legal edge consecutive matrix LJH for coalition H satisfies
LJH = [(BHin)T · (BHout)] ◦ (El − D),
where ‘‘◦’’ denotes the Hadamard product and D is defined by Eq. (2).
See [17] for the proof.
Lemma 3. For a graphmodel G, let t be an integer, H ⊆ N, and (LJH)t(a, b) be the (a, b) entry of matrix (LJH)t . Then, (LJH)t(a, b)
denotes the number of legal paths for H in G from edge a to edge bwith length t for a, b ∈ A.Moreover, if a = (u, s) and b = (q, v)
for u, s, q, v ∈ S, then the number of the legal paths for H from state u to state v with length t + 1 is at least (LJH)t(a, b).
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 8.1.2 in [23]. The legal path denotes a path in which any two consecutive edges are
controlled by different DMs.
Theorem 1. Let l1 denote the number of arcs in AH . For a graph model G, the UM reachability matrix MH for H can be obtained
by using
MH = sign[BHout · (LJH + I)l1−1 · (BHin)T ], (6)
where I is the identity matrix.
Proof. Let C tl1−1 =
(
l1 − 1
t
)
= (l1−1)·(l1−2)···(l1−t)t! and (LJH)0 = I . Using matrix theory,
(LJH + I)l1−1 =
l1−1∑
t=0
C tl1−1 · (LJH)t .
Let Q = sign[BHout · (LJH + I)l1−1 · (BHin)T ]. Since C tl1−1 > 0, then
Q = sign
[
l1−1∑
t=0
C tl1−1 · BHout · (LJH)t · (BHin)T
]
= [BHout · I · (BHin)T ]
∨[l1−1∨
t=1
(BHout · (LJH)t · (BHin)T )
]
.
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Here, ‘‘∨’’ denote the disjunction operator (‘‘or’’) on twomatrices. On the basis of Lemma 1, Q = (JH)∨[∨l1−1t=1 (BHout · (LJH)t ·
(BHin)
T )].
Then, Q (s, q) 6= 0 iff JH(s, q) 6= 0 or for 1 ≤ t ≤ l1 − 1, there exists (LJH)t(a, b) 6= 0 such that a, b ∈ AH , a = (s, u), and
b = (v, q) for s, q, u, v ∈ S. JH(s, q) 6= 0 implies that state q is reachable from state s in one step. By Lemma3, (LJH)t(a, b) 6= 0
iff state q is reachable from state s by legal paths for H with length t + 1. Therefore, Q (s, q) 6= 0 iff state q is reachable from
state s by legal paths PAH(s, q)with length 1 or t + 1 for 1 ≤ t ≤ l1 − 1, i.e., Q (s, q) 6= 0 impliesMH(s, q) 6= 0.
By Definition 17, MH(s, q) 6= 0 iff state q is reachable from state s by the legal sequences of UMs by coalition H . Then
MH(s, q) 6= 0 implies that Q (s, q) 6= 0. SinceMH and Q are 0–1 matrices,MH = sign[(BHout) · (LJH + I)l1−1 · (BHin)T ]. 
4.2. Matrix representation of coalition stabilities in the graph model with simple preference
Let E be them×mmatrix with each entry equal to 1 and es denote the s-th standard basis vector of them-dimensional
Euclidean space, RS . LetMH denote the UM reachability matrix, by H ⊆ N .
Define them×m stability matrix for coalition H by
MCH = MH · [E − (P−,=H )T ],
where P−,=H =
∨
i∈H P
−,=
i and (P
−,=
H )
T is the transpose of the preference matrix P−,=i .
Theorem 2. Suppose H ⊆ N and |H| ≥ 2. State s ∈ S is Nash stable for coalition H iff eTs ·MCH · es = 0.
Proof. Since
eTs ·MCH · es = (eTs ·MH) · [
(
E − (P−,=H )T
) · es]
=
m∑
s1=1
MH(s, s1)[1− P−,=H (s, s1)],
then eTs ·MCH · es = 0 iff P−,=H (s, s1) = 1 for any s1 ∈ RH(s). Clearly,
P−,=H (s, s1) =
(∨
i∈H
P−,=i
)
(s, s1) = 1
iff there exists i ∈ H such that P−,=i (s, s1) = 1, i.e., si s1. Consequently, the proof of the theorem followsbyDefinition 1. 
Theorem 3. State s ∈ S is coalitionally Nash stable iff ∑∀H⊆N,|H|≥2 eTs ·MCH · es = 0.
Proof. Since
∑
∀H⊆N,|H|≥2 eTs · MCH · es = 0 iff for any H ⊆ N with |H| ≥ 2, eTs · MCH · es = 0. By Theorem 2, eTs · MCH · es = 0
iff s ∈ S is Nash stable for coalition H . Consequently,∑H⊆N,|H|≥2 eTs · MCH · es = 0 iff s ∈ S is Nash stable for any coalition
H ⊆ N with |H| ≥ 2. The proof is completed by Definition 2. 
Theorems 2 and 3 prove the proposed matrix representations of coalition stabilities equivalent to the logical
representations proposed by Kilgour et al. [5]. The matrix representation can be extended to models including uncertain
preference, which is the objective of the next subsection.
4.3. Matrix representation of coalition stabilities in the graph model with uncertain preference
Define them×m conservative stability matrix for coalition H by
MCUcH = MH · [E − (P−,=,UH )T ], where P−,=,UH =
∨
i∈H
P−,=,Ui . (7)
Theorem 4. Suppose H ⊆ N and |H| ≥ 2. State s ∈ S is conservatively Nash stable for coalition H iff eTs ·MCUcH · es = 0.
The proof of this theorem is similar to that for Theorem 2.
Define them×m aggressive stability matrix for coalition H by
MCUaH = MH · [E − (P−,=H )T ], where P−,=H =
∨
i∈H
P−,=i . (8)
Theorem 5. Suppose H ⊆ N and |H| ≥ 2. State s ∈ S is aggressively Nash stable for coalition H iff eTs ·MCUaH · es = 0.
The proof of this theorem is similar to that for Theorem 2.
Theorems 4 and 5 prove the proposed matrix representation of coalition stability in the graph model with unknown
preference equivalent to the logical representations proposed by Definitions 11 and 13.
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Fig. 4. An integrated algebraic paradigm for post-stability analysis.
Table 2
Options and feasible states for the Gisborne conflict [12].
Federal
1. Continue N Y N Y N Y N Y
Provincial
2. Lift N N Y Y N N Y Y
Support
3. Appeal N N N N Y Y Y Y
States s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
4.4. The link between status quo analysis and coalition analysis
Analysis of a graph model involves searching paths in a graph but an important restriction of a graph model is that no
DM can move twice in succession along any path. Therefore, it is difficult to use existing methods or algorithms, including
genetic algorithms [24] and neural networks [25], directly to find the legal paths. Xu et al. [17] developed the matrix
function LJH to transform the problem of searching edge-colored paths for status quo analysis in a colored multidigraph
to a standard problem of finding paths in a simple digraph with no color constraints. Due to the nature of the explicit
algebraic expressions, the matrix function is convenient and extendable, from tracking the evolution of a conflict for status
quo analysis to calculating coalition matrices for coalition stability analysis. By Theorem 1, the matrix function can be used
to construct the reachability matrix of coalition H , which is essential for calculating coalition stabilities using the matrix
approach. Therefore, the matrix function LJH bridges the gap between status quo analysis and coalition analysis as shown in
Fig. 4, and establishes an integrated algebraic paradigm for post-stability analysis.
5. Coalition stability analysis for the Gisborne conflict with preference uncertainty
5.1. History of the Lake Gisborne conflict
In June 1995, a project was proposed by a division of the McCurdy Group of Companies, Canada Wet Incorporated, to
export bulk water from Lake Gisborne that is located near the south coast of a Canadian Atlantic province of Newfoundland
and Labrador. On December 5, 1996, the government of Newfoundland and Labrador (provincial government) approved
this project because of its potential economic benefits. However, because of unpredictable harmful impacts on the local
environment, awide variety of lobby groups opposed the proposal. The federal government of Canada sidedwith the opposing
groups by introducing a policy to forbid bulk water export from Lake Gisborne in Canada. By force of themounting pressure,
the provincial government introduced a new bill to ban bulk water export and force Canada Wet to abandon the Gisborne
Water Export project. (See details in [12,18].)
Nevertheless, several support groups remain interested in the project and convincing the provincial government of the
urgent need for cash. The economics-oriented provincial government might restart the project. The two different attitudes
of the provincial government result in uncertainty in preferences in the Gisborne conflict. This conflict was modeled by Li
et al. [12] using three DMs: DM 1, Federal (Fe); DM 2, Provincial (Pr); and DM 3, Support (Su); and a total of three options.
• Federal government of Canada (Federal): its options are to continue a Canada-wide accord on the prohibition of bulk
water export (Continue) or not.
• Provincial government of Newfoundland and Labrador (Provincial): its options are to lift the ban on bulk water export
(Lift) or not.
• Support groups (Support): their options are to appeal for continuing the Gisborne project (Appeal) or not.
In the Lake Gisborne model, the three options together determine eight possible states as listed in Table 2, where a ‘‘Y’’
indicates that an option is selected by theDMcontrolling it and an ‘‘N’’means that the option is not chosen. Each state denotes
a strategy. For instance, s4 means that the federal government will continue prohibiting bulk water export, the provincial
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(2)
Fig. 5. Integrated graph for the Gisborne conflict.
Table 3
Preferences information for the Gisborne model [12].
DMs Certain preferences
Federal s2  s6  s4  s8  s1  s5  s3  s7
Provincial s3  s7 , s4  s8 , s1  s5 , s2  s6 , only
Support s3  s4  s7  s8  s5  s6  s1  s2
government will lift the ban on bulk water export, and the support groups will not appeal for starting this project. The
graphmodel of the Lake Gisborne conflict is shown in Fig. 5(1), where the labels on the arcs identify the DMs controlling the
relevant moves. According to the Rule of Priority, Fig. 5(1) is converted to an edge labeled multidigraph as shown in Fig. 5(2).
Preference information over the states is given in Table 3, where  represents the strict preference relation and is
assumed transitive. As shown in Table 3, the Federal and Support preference information is complete, but Provincial’s
preference is assumed to be partially known. For example, Provincial’s preference is uncertain between states s1 and s2,
i.e., it may prefer state s1 to state s2, may prefer state s2 to state s1, or may be indifferent between s1 and s2.
5.2. A matrix procedure for determining coalition stability
We use the Gisborne conflict as an example to show how to carry out the coalition analysis using the proposed matrix
approach. Let N = {1, 2, 3} denote the set of DMs and Hi = N \ {i}, for i = 1, 2, 3, be three coalitions.
(1) Construct preference matrices, P−,=i and P
−,=,U
i , for i = 1, 2, 3, defined by Eqs. (3) and (4), using information provided
by Table 3.
(2) Construct incidence matrices BHi for Hi = N \ {i} and i = 1, 2, 3, as suggested by Fig. 5, and then calculate (BHi)in and
(BHi)out.
(3) Calculate the matrix function LJHi and the UM reachability matrixMHi using Lemma 2 and Theorem 1, respectively.
1174 H. Xu et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 60 (2010) 1164–1176
Table 4
UM reachability matrices of Hi = N \ {i} for i = 1, 2, 3 for the Gisborne conflict.
Matrix MN\{1} MN\{2} MN\{3}
State s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
s1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
s2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
s3 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
s4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
s5 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
s6 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
s7 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
s8 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
Table 5
Conservative stability matrices of coalition Hi = N \ {i} for i = 1, 2, 3 for the Gisborne conflict.
Matrix MCUcN\{1} M
CUc
N\{2} M
CUc
N\{3}
State s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
s1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
s2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
s3 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
s4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
s5 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
s6 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
s7 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
s8 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
(4) Calculate the conservative stability matrix MCUcHi and the aggressive stability matrix M
CUa
Hi
of coalition Hi, using Eqs. (7)
and (8), respectively.
(5) Analyze the coalition stability of each state of the Gisborne model using Theorems 4 and 5.
Using the procedure, the UM reachability matrices for the Gisborne model are presented in Table 4.
It is obvious that if RH(s) is written as a 0–1 row vector, then the UM reachability matrixMH and the reachable list from
state s have the following relation:
RH(s) = eTs ·MH .
For example, we analyze the UM reachability matrix, MH2 , using Table 4 with H2 = N \ {2}. Since eT2 · MH2 = (1, 0, 0,
0, 1, 1, 0, 0), then RH2(s2) = {s1, s5, s6}, which means that states s1, s5, and s6 can be reached by legal sequences of UMs by
DMs in H2 = {1, 3} from the status quo s2.
5.3. Analysis for conflict resolution
Reflecting that DMs have distinct risk profiles in the face of uncertainty, the four basic stabilities – Nash, GMR, SMR, and
SEQ – are redefined by Li et al. [12] in four ways indexed a, b, c , and d. For example, the definitions indexed c incorporate
a DM’s mixed attitude toward the risk associated with states of uncertain preference, whereas solution concepts indexed
d represent stabilities for the most conservative DMs. Li et al. [12] identify states s4 and s6 as equilibria under extension b
and d for the Gisborne conflict, so s4 and s6 are likely resolutions for the Gisborne conflict with preference uncertainty. At an
equilibrium, no individual DM has any incentive to move away, but a coalition may sometimes be able to move away from
the equilibrium to a state preferred by all members of the coalition. As follow-up analysis, coalition stabilities can be carried
out to select a resolution that is not only stable individually but also invulnerable to coalition moves.
For the Gisborne model, there exist four non-trivial coalitions, H1 = {Pr, Su}, H2 = {Fe, Su}, H3 = {Fe, Pr}, and
N = {Fe, Pr, Su}. For example, if the provincial government sides with the support group, then it is called economics-
oriented, which could imply that Provincial and Support cooperate to form a coalition H1 = {Pr, Su}. On the other hand, a
provincial government that accepts the federal government’s suggestion is called environment-oriented; it might form a
coalition H3 = {Fe, Pr}. Fig. 5 shows that neither Provincial nor Support can make a unilateral move from state s6 to state
s4, but s4 ∈ RH1(s6). We use the logical definition of coalition stability presented in Definition 13 to analyze the aggressive
Nash stabilities of coalition H1 for states s4 and s6. Since s4U2s6 and s43 s6, state s4 is a coalition improvement or uncertain
move from s6 for H1. Hence, s6 is unstable for coalition H1. Similarly, for s2 ∈ RH3(s4), s2U2s4 and s21 s4, so s4 is unstable
for coalition H3.
Using the proposed matrix representation for coalition stabilities, the conservative and aggressive stability matrices of
the coalition Hi = N \ {i}, for i = 1, 2, 3, for the Gisborne model are presented in Tables 5 and 6. Using the information
provided by Table 5, states s4 and s6 are conservatively stable for coalitions Hi with i = 1, 2, 3, because the (4, 4) and (6, 6)
entries of conservative stability matrices of coalitions Hi are zero, i.e., MCUcN\{i}(4, 4) = MCUcN\{i}(6, 6) = 0. Therefore, states
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Table 6
Aggressive stability matrices of coalition Hi = N \ {i} for i = 1, 2, 3 for the Gisborne conflict.
Matrix MCUaN\{1} M
CUa
N\{2} M
CUa
N\{3}
State s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
s1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
s3 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s4 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
s6 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
s7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
s8 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
s4 and s6 are coalitionally conservatively stable. However, from Table 6, the aggressive stability matrix of coalition H1 =
{Pr, Su} has (4, 4) entry zero, i.e., MCUaN\{1}(4, 4) = 0, but MCUaN\{1}(6, 6) 6= 0. Then s4 is the only possible resolution for the
Gisborne conflict when the support group convinces the provincial government of the urgent need for cash. Similarly, since
MCUaN\{3}(4, 4) 6= 0, but MCUaN\{3}(6, 6) = 0, state s6 is a resolution for the Gisborne model when the provincial government
accepts the federal government’s suggestion of protecting the local environment. From the above discussion, we find that
the resolution of the conflict depends on the provincial government’s attitude. If the support group convinces the provincial
government of the urgent need for cash, state s4 is selected as a resolution for resolving the Gisborne conflict, which
means that the economics-oriented provincial government will lift the ban on bulk water export. On the other hand, if
there is communication and cooperation between the provincial government and the federal government, the individual
equilibrium state s4 is vulnerable to moves by coalition H3. The instability of state s4 for the coalition H3 makes it unlikely to
survive as a resolution for the Gisborne conflict. The resolution for the Gisborne conflict is selected as state s6, which means
that an environment-oriented provincial government will not lift the ban.
6. Conclusions and future work
In the original graph model, coalition stability analysis is carried out within a logical structure for simple preference [5].
However, the nature of the logical representations makes coding difficult and simple preference is inadequate for modeling
the complex strategic conflicts. Preference uncertainty was introduced into the graph model for conflict resolution [12],
but was never incorporated into coalition analysis. To overcome these challenges and enhance the applicability of coalition
analysis, coalition stability is extended in this paper to include uncertain preference.
Compared with existing approaches, the main advantages of the proposed method are presented as follows: It
• keeps consistency with matrix representations of stability analysis;
• integrates status quo analysis with coalition analysis;
• provides explicit algebraic expressions that may be adapted for new coalitional solution concepts;
• facilitates the development of improved algorithms for assessing coalitional stabilities of states.
Coalition stabilities derived in this paper may be expanded to include strength of preference [26,27]. Inohara and
Hipel’s work [6,7] for coalition stabilities of Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ will be improved and expanded to models including
preference uncertainty and strength of preference.
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